Recent work has demonstrated that young children already engage in a variety of prosocial actions and evaluate the prosociality of others' behavior. A new study highlights the neural mechanisms that subserve perception and production of prosocial behavior in preschool children.
Recent years have seen an increased interest in the ontogenetic origins and early development of human prosociality. A number of studies have demonstrated that young children engage in a variety of prosocial behaviors such as helping, sharing, and comforting. Additionally, they seem to predict and evaluate the prosociality of others' behavior. Notwithstanding this increased interest and the relevance of such prosocial orientations for the development of social functioning [1] , research on the neural bases of children's early emerging prosociality has remained sparse. A new study by Jason Cowell and Jean Decety in this issue of Current Biology [2] now shows that electrophysiological markers that index cognitively controlled appraisal (the late positive potential; LPP) relate to preschool children's perception of prosociality and antisociality in others, and predict their own generosity in a subsequent sharing situation. This indicates that preschoolers' sharing is not an automatized behavioral routine, but a cognitively controlled process.
Young children's tendencies to act prosocially are indeed astounding. They have been shown to help strangers in need to finish an initiated, yet not complemented action (e.g., by handing over a missing object [3] ). They share valuable resources with known as well as anonymous others [4] , and they show empathic reactions towards others in pain [5] . While numerous studies replicated these phenomena, the underlying processes have remained hotly debated [6] . Particularly, the psychological mechanisms and motives of children's sharing decisions have been vividly discussed, ranging from altruistic tendencies [7] to the rewarding nature of sharing [8] to strategic motives in the service of mere self-interest [9] . This debate is partly informed by research on preschool children's perception, prediction, and evaluation of others' pro-and antisocial actions. Here, research has shown that preschool children evaluate an agent who helped another person as more positive and also share more with him, while they tend to punish others that are antisocial [10] . Additionally, preschool children's expectations of others' generosity towards their friends and nonfriends are highly correlated to their own inclination to share generously with both types [11] . These studies highlight a relation between preschool children's reasoning and evaluation about others' prosociality and their own inclination to share. Yet, they leave open the psychological mechanisms that subserve these relations. A recurrent issue of debate concerns the question to what extent the processes guiding prosocial behavior and evaluations are automatic and rather involuntary, or indeed cognitively controlled.
Intriguingly, the recent paper by Jason Cowell and Jean Decety provides tentative answers to these questions. Firstly, the authors presented 3-to 5-year-old preschoolers with short vignettes that depicted pro-and antisocial behaviors while assessing their electrophysiological responses (Figure 1 ). Such behaviors have already been shown to differently attract infants' attention [12] and preschoolers have been shown to prefer a pro-over an antisocial actor when they are asked to allocate resources to others [10] . The authors now find that early markers that are indicative of automatic attentional processes, as well as later markers that indicate cognitively controlled processes, differed between both scenarios. This is particularly interesting as it demonstrates that preschoolers' preferences for pro-over antisocial others is not merely due to simple attentional processes, but is also based on a cognitively controlled evaluation of the others' behaviors.
The second major finding concerns the study's second part. After participants watched the pro-and antisocial vignettes, they had the opportunity to share resources with an anonymous other child. Children's generosity towards the anonymous other was predicted by their neural responses to the previously demonstrated vignettes. Most interestingly, the later electrophysiological markers, i.e. markers that are indicative of more controlled processes, predicted children's generosity. This finding expands recent behavioral findings on relations between young children's sharing and their processing of others' sharing behavior. It might indicate that the common neurocognitive substrate that subserves both sharing behavior and sharing expectations in young children is cognitive appraisal of the level of prosociality of particular behaviors.
While this finding advances our understanding of the neurocognitive substrate underlying the early development of prosocial behavior, it also generates avenues for further research and raises important questions. For example, widely noticed work has demonstrated that preverbal infants already seem to differentiate between pro-and antisocially acting others. In particular, they react more surprised when an animated protagonist approaches an agent who has previously behaved antisocially (e.g., hindered) towards him [12] . These studies have important consequences for our understanding of the origins of human morality. Yet, it has been debated whether infants' reactions to these displays indeed constitute a moral evaluation of the respective agents or can be more parsimoniously explained by simple attentional preferences for perceptual features of the displays [13] . It seems that Cowell and Decety's procedure and analyses could be used to disentangle the role of cognitive and attentional processes in infants' perception of pro-and antisocial others, and thus reveal something about the ontogenetic origins of human morality.
Moreover, the present study is restricted to one instance of prosocial behavior, namely the sharing of resources with others. Concurrent [14] and longitudinal [15] behavioral studies demonstrated that in preschool children different instances of prosocial behavior are not correlated with each other. More specifically, young children's tendency to provide instrumental help (i.e., low-cost helping behavior that helps another person to achieve their goal, for example, by opening a door or picking up an object from the ground) does not relate concurrently to their costly sharing (i.e., giving up own resources to benefit another person), nor does it predict the later development of costly sharing. Moreover, neuroscientific work with infants has indicated that different neurophysiological activation patterns relate to the emergence of the various instances (i.e., helping, comforting) of prosocial behavior, indicating that prosocial action has qualitatively distinct roots [16] . Here, it is noteworthy that in Cowell and Decety's study children's perception of a variety of pro-and antisocial actions predicted their sharing behavior. Future studies are necessary to see whether Cowell and Decety's findings are specific for one type of prosocial action (i.e., sharing) or extend also to other instances of prosociality (i.e., helping, comforting).
Finally, the neurophysiological measures were not obtained during children's actual prosocial responding, but in an independent assessment/situation in advance of the sharing situation. Although the current results point strongly to the neurocognitive substrate underlying early sharing, they raise the question of whether the same neurocognitive processes are indeed involved in children's real-time decision making in a sharing situation. It seems that the neuroscientific examination of the ontogenetic roots of human prosociality and morality has just begun. Figure 1 . The roots of generosity in human development. In a recent study [2] , Cowell and Decety recorded EEG/ERPs while children viewed dynamic scenarios depicting prosocial and antisocial behaviors. Subsequently, the children had the opportunity to share resources with an anonymous other. In the EEG, the authors analyzed ERP markers that relate to early attentional and later cognitively controlled processes. It was found that neural markers of implicit moral evaluations, which are indicative of cognitively controlled processing, predict generosity in young children in the subsequent resource allocation context. This suggests that a cognitive appraisal of prosociality underlies both the perception of others' (pro-and antisocial) behavior as well as self prosocial action. (Photo courtesy of Jean Decety.)
